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Many  countries  plan  to  increase  the  proportion  of  their  electricity  supply  obtained  from 
renewable sources relative to nonrenewable sources. Recently, the EU has implemented a 
system of tradable emission permits and many countries have introduced systems of tradable 
green certificates (TGCs). In this paper, we analyze how integrated TGC markets function and 
how they are affected by harsher CO2 emission constraints. A key result of our analytical 
model is that TGCs may be an imprecise instrument for regulating the generation of green 
electricity. Furthermore, our analysis shows that the combination of TGCs with a system of 
tradable emission permits may yield outcomes contrary to the intended purpose. The results 
are valid under both autarky and international trade. 
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1. Introduction
3 
Many countries pursue policies to increase the share of renewable energy in their total energy 
consumption. For example, the EU has an explicit target to  increase its share  of "green" 
electricity, generated from renewable energy sources, from its current level of 14% to 22% by 
2010  (EU/COM,  2000).  Similar  targets  exist  for  the  USA  (e.g.,  see  EPA,  2003).  Until 
recently, the generation of green electricity had been stimulated by various subsidy schemes, 
including subsidized investments, tax relief, and direct subsidies per unit of green electricity 
generated. However, with the liberalization of electricity markets, interest has shifted towards 
other subsidy measures. One proposition that has become popular is to introduce systems of 
tradable green certificates (TGCs). Such systems tend to have different designs in different 
countries,  but  a  common  feature  is  that  they  seek  to  replace  direct  public  subsidies  for 
renewable energy with incentive systems that use the market mechanism. More precisely, the 
objective is to create a market where various kinds of green electricity compete on equal 
terms to relieve the government of the burden of direct involvement in the electricity sector's 
investment decisions. 
 
Since 1998, the Netherlands has applied a system of "green labeling", which is a voluntary 
system of  green  certificates. The UK  and  Sweden have compulsory systems  that use the 
market mechanism more directly for TGC trading. These systems differ significantly from the 
more established feed-in tariff subsidy schemes that exist in countries such as Germany (see 
Butler and Neuhoff, 2004). Many European countries participate in the Renewable Energy 
Certificate System (RECS) that, although not a support scheme itself, facilitates many support 
schemes  for  green  energy.
4  In  addition,  several  countries  outside  the  EU  have  shown  an 
interest  in  introducing  TGC  systems,  including  Australia,  USA,  China,  and  India  (see 
Giovinetto, 2003). 
 
In 2002, the UK introduced a TCG system called the UK Renewables Obligation Certificate 
(ROC) Market. Sweden introduced its system in 2003. The Norwegian Parliament has decided 
that Norway will introduce a TGC system on January 1, 2006. The plan is that Norway and 
Sweden will start trading TGCs from this date onwards, creating the first integrated TGC 
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market involving several countries.
5 As well as analyzing the general functioning of a TGC 
market of the Nordic type,
6 this paper discusses how a TGC market is expected to perform
7 
when it expands to include several countries. 
 
Along  with  the  development  of  the  TGC  markets  in  Europe,  a  more  general  and 
comprehensive system of CO2 emission permits trading (ETS)
8 is about to emerge in the EU. 
The simple idea underlying the ETS is that the emission permit price will add to the cost of 
using a CO2-emitting resource, the cost increment being in proportion to the emissions per 
unit of the resource used. As a result, input substitution is expected to take place in electricity 
generation, away from coal and gas power towards hydro, wind, and nuclear power. Hence, 
even  though this system is  not directly targeted at increasing the  share of  renewables  in 
electricity  provision,  clearly  the  system  will  have  an  influence  on  the  relative  cost  of 
providing green electricity. An essential issue dealt with in this paper is the compatibility of 
the TGC and ETS systems, with particular emphasis on how harsher CO2 emission constraints 
affect the generation of green electricity within the setting of a TGC market. 
 
As in any other market, the markets for TGCs consist of suppliers and buyers. Suppliers are 
the  producers  of  green  electricity  who  receive  an  amount  of  TGCs  corresponding  to  the 
amount of green electricity they generate. The suppliers may sell these TGCs on the TGC 
market. In this way, the producers receive both the wholesale price and the TGC price per 
MWh of green electricity generated. Buyers of TGCs are the retailers or consumers, who are 
obliged by the government to keep a certain amount of TGCs in relation to the total amount of 
electricity they consume (i.e., both green and "black" electricity). This requirement is referred 
to  as  the  "percentage  requirement".  Thus,  the  demand  for  TGCs  is  derived  simply  as  a 
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percentage of the total end use demand for electricity. Based on supply and demand, a single 
TGC price is established between administratively set upper and lower price bounds. 
 
The TGC markets are based on two policy measures that the government uses to influence the 
role of green electricity in the power market; these are the percentage requirement and the 
upper and lower price bounds for the TGC price. The percentage requirement is particularly 
important, but the price bounds may also play a significant role.
9 Both Sweden and the UK 
have  specific  plans  to  increase  their  percentage  requirements.  Thus,  the  percentage 
requirement is viewed as a means of attaining specific targets for green electricity. Amundsen 
and Mortensen (2001) investigated aspects of these policy measures for domestic TGC and 
electricity markets. TGC price volatility and banking were dealt with by Amundsen et al. 
(2004),  whereas  market  power  issues  were  addressed  in  Amundsen  and  Nese  (2002). 
Furthermore,  numerical  models  of  TGC  and  electricity  markets  for  specific  regions  and 
settings have been formulated and analyzed (e.g., Bergman and Radetzki, 2003; Bye 2003; 
Hindsberger et al., 2003; Nese, 2003). 
 
As mentioned above, the main problems investigated in this paper relate to the integration of 
TGC markets and how these markets are affected by acting in concert with a CO2 permits 
market,  such  as  the  emerging  European  ETS  system.  To  some  extent,  problems  of 
compatibility have been addressed earlier; e.g., in Finon and Menanteau (2003), Jensen and 
Skytte (2003), and Unger and Ahlgren (2003). However, unlike these papers, our focus is on 
the integration of domestic TGC markets into a joint TGC market and the effects of the major 
policy measure, the percentage requirement. Seemingly paradoxical results are derived from 
the analysis, such as the finding that an increase of the percentage requirement in one country 
may  lead  to  less  green  electricity  generation  in  this  country,  but  more  green  electricity 
generation in another country. Another example is the result that a harsher emission constraint 
in the CO2 emission permits market may actually lead to less green electricity generation 
when TGC markets are involved. Such results will be derived and explained 
 
Although the questions we pose are simple, it is not so easy to derive both general and precise 
answers. Consequently, a formal approach is required, and we formulate an analytical model 
                                                
9 On the significance of price bounds, see, for example, Amundsen and Nese (2002). We will not deal with the 
importance of price bounds in this paper.   5 
with general assumptions; e.g., for demand and cost functions. From this model, we derive 
and prove specific results. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we consider the joint functioning of a TGC market and 
an electricity market under autarky, focusing on questions such as how the generation of 
green  electricity  is  affected  by  an  increase  of  the  percentage  requirement  in  one  of  the 
participating countries, or by harsher CO2 emission constraints. Then, we analyze the case 
where two countries trade in electricity, but not in TGCs. This situation may be considered an 
interim case before a complete set of markets is in place. However, even in such a case, 
changes in the TGC market of one country may influence the TGC market of another country, 
as well as the common electricity market. Therefore, we proceed to analyze cases involving 
both a common TGC market and a common electricity market. Finally, we discuss the results 
obtained and conclude the paper. 
 
2. The model under autarky 
In order to analyze the interplay between the electricity market and the TGC market in a long-
run setting under autarky, we apply the following symbols and functional relationships. 
 
= p End-user price of electricity 
= s Price of TGCs 
= q Wholesale price of electricity 
= x Total consumption of electricity 
= y Production of "black" electricity 
= z Production of "green" electricity 
= a  Green electricity required as a proportion of total electricity consumption ("percentage 
requirement") 
= b Emission constraint on CO2 
=
d g Demand for TGCs 
=
s g Supply of TGCs 
) (x p : Inverse demand function of electricity, where  0 ' ) / ) ( ( < = ¶ ¶ p x x p    6 
) ; ( b y c c = :  Industry  cost  function
10  for  black  electricity  with  emission constraints.
11 We 




















. The case where 0 = b  signifies that there are 
no emission constraints. 














(.) P = P : Profit function 
 
2.1. First-order conditions and the equilibrium 
The electricity producers supply a common wholesale market within which a single wholesale 
electricity price is established. Retailers purchase electricity on the  wholesale market and 
TGCs on the TGC market. The electricity is distributed to end users and a single end-user 
price is established. It is assumed that perfect competition prevails in all markets, with many 
producers of black and green electricity, many retailers, and many end users of electricity. 
Hence, all agents treat the various prices as given by the market. 
 
The producers act as if they jointly maximize: 
 
[ ] ) ( ) ; ( ) ( z h y c z s q qy y - - + + = P b . 
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constraint is made harsher. This is possible if suppliers use cleaner fuels and cleaner generation technologies. 
However, such a substitution implies increased generation costs, which shift the cost curve upwards compared 
with its position before the introduction of firmer emission constraints.   7 
 











For each unit of electricity (i.e., each MWh) purchased in the wholesale market and sold on to 
end users, retailers have to pay the wholesale price plus a share a  of the TGC price. For 
simplicity, electricity distribution is assumed to be costless. With a large number of retailers, 
the  equilibrium  established  in  the  market  (i.e.,  the  competitive  equilibrium)  must  be 
characterized by: 
 
s q p a + = . 
 
We assume that the amount of TGCs is measured in the same units as the amount of green 
electricity. Thus, the demand for TGCs is given by  x g
d a =  and the supply of TGCs is given 
by z g
s = . 
 
Denoting equilibrium prices and quantities by starred symbols, the equilibrium of the two 
markets is characterized by: 
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Inserting 2), 3), and 4) into 1), we find that the end-user price in equilibrium may be written 
as a linear combination of the marginal costs of black and green electricity: 
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From 2), we see that 
* * x z a = and 
* * ) 1 ( x y a - = . 
 
 
2.2. The effects of the percentage requirement as a means for promoting green electricity 
generation 
 
In  the  TGC  systems,  the  percentage  requirement  is  perceived  as  a  policy  instrument  to 
determine the amount of  green electricity in end-use consumption. However,  because the 
requirement is set as a percentage and not as a specific quantity, it is not necessarily true that 
an increase of the percentage requirement leads to an increase of green electricity generation. 
The share of green electricity generation in total electricity consumption may well increase 
even if green electricity generation declines, if there is a sufficient reduction of electricity 
consumption  and  of  black  electricity  generation.  However,  an  increase  in  the  percentage 
requirement will definitely lead to a reduction of black electricity generation and, therefore, a 
reduction  in  the  wholesale  price  of  electricity  (see  condition  3).  As  the  effect  on  the 
generation of green electricity is indeterminate, the effects on total electricity generation and 
consumption, as well as the end-user price, are also indeterminate. 
 
In the following section, we study these effects in more detail.
12 To examine the effect of an 
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=   into  (5)  and  take  the  implicit  derivates.  Hence, 
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An inspection of the signs shows that the denominator is negative, whereas the numerator is 
indeterminate. Hence, the effect on green electricity generation is indeterminate. 
 
In  the  same  way,  we  obtain  an  equation  representing  the  effect  of  an  increase  in  the 

































An inspection of the signs shows that the numerator is positive, whereas the denominator is 
negative.  The  generation  of  black  electricity  is  reduced  as  the  percentage  requirement 
increases. 
 

































An inspection of the signs shows that this expression is generally indeterminate. However, if 












an  increase  of  the  percentage  requirement  will  lead  to  a  reduction  of  total  electricity 
consumption. However, the impact on green electricity generation remains indeterminate. In 
addition, the effects depend on the level of the percentage requirement, a .
13 For example, if 







                                                
13 By simplifying the functional forms of the model, for example by assuming linear or constant elastic demand 
and linear marginal cost functions, it is possible to study in more detail how the electricity consumption changes 
as the percentage requirement increases from 0 to 100%; see Bye (2003) and Jensen and Skytte (2002).   10 
 
Hence,  in  conclusion,  the  introduction  of  a  TGC  system  of  the  Nordic  type  does  not 
necessarily lead to greater green electricity generation, but it is true that it will lead to a 
reduction of black electricity. Furthermore, it is not obvious how total electricity generation is 
affected. 
 
2.3. The effects of harsher CO2 emission constraints 
In order to investigate the equilibrium effect of harsher CO2 emission constraints on green 



















With the assumed cross effects of the marginal cost function of black electricity it follows that 
the numerator is positive while the denominator is negative. Therefore, the total effect is 
negative.  Hence,  harsher  CO2  emission  constraints  will  not  lead  to  an  increase  in  the 
generation of green electricity. On the contrary, generation of green electricity will decline.
14 
Owing to the fact that 
* * * ) 1 ( y x z a a a - = = , both the generation of black electricity and the 
total  consumption  will  be  reduced  as  the  CO2  emission  constraint  becomes  harsher. 
Furthermore, we see from expression 4) that a reduction in the generation of green electricity 
implies that the sum of the wholesale price and the TGC price must fall. However, it is not 
necessarily true that both the wholesale price and the TGC price fall. 
 
It  may  seem  paradoxical  that  harsher  CO2  emission  constraints  can  actually  lead  to  a 
reduction  in  the  generation  of  green  electricity.  Harsher  emission  constraints  imply  an 
increase in the price of emission permits, which is supposed to advantage the producers of 
green electricity. However, owing to the interplay of the emission constraints with the TGC 
market, this will not be the case despite the fact that, viewed in isolation, both systems work 
towards the same end, a reduction of CO2 emissions. The reason for this lies in the specific 
construction of the TGC system. Harsher CO2 constraints imply an increase in the price of 
                                                
14 In general, any positive shift of the marginal cost function for black electricity (such as may result from an 
increase of input prices in the generation of black electricity) will induce a reduction in the generation of green 
electricity.   11 
emission  permits  and  an  increase  in  the  wholesale  price  of  electricity.  Within  the  TGC 
system, this implies that the TGC price is reduced by more than the increase in the wholesale 
price (depending on the size of the percentage requirement), so that the sum of the TGC price 
and the wholesale price is reduced. The extra remuneration for green electricity generation in 
the TGC system is composed of the margin between the wholesale price and the end-user 
price. As the wholesale price increases in response to the harsher emission constraints, this 
margin, equal to the TGC price multiplied by the percentage requirement, will be reduced. To 
recognize this, assume, as an example, that this margin is reduced by one cent and that the 
percentage requirement is 20%. In such a case, the TGC price will be reduced by 1/0.2 = 5 
cents. Therefore, the total remuneration to producers of green electricity (i.e., the sum of the 
wholesale  price  and  the  TGC  price)  is  reduced.  Consequently,  the  equilibrium  effects  of 
harsher CO2 emission constraints are reductions in both black and green electricity generation. 
 
3. Trade in electricity 
In this section, we investigate how a TGC system functions in an open economy. Thus, we 
expand the model to include simultaneously functioning markets for electricity and TGCs in 
two countries, country A and country B. The variables involved are the same as those under 
autarky, but there is one set of variables for each country. In addition, we introduce the "trade 
variables",  m  and  n,  representing  imports  of  electricity  and  TGCs,  respectively.  In  the 
exposition to follow, we apply the subscript i, where i = A, B. Demand may differ between 
the two countries, and it is assumed that the inverse demand functions are given by: 
 










Furthermore,  we  assume  that  the  technologies  applied  in  generating  black  and  green 
electricity may differ between the two countries. This implies that comparative advantages 
and disadvantages may exist in the generation of black and green electricity in each of the 
countries. 
   12 
The cost function of black electricity in country i is given by:
15 
 




























The cost function of green electricity in country i is given by: 
 



















3.1. First-order conditions and the equilibrium 
First,  we  assume  that  cross-border  trade  takes  place  only  for  electricity,  not  for  TGCs. 
Furthermore, for simplicity, we assume that there are no transaction costs involved and that 
there  are  no  transmission  constraints  between  the  countries.  For  these  reasons,  we  can 
consider the electricity markets of countries A and B to be a single market with a common 
wholesale price; i.e.,  M B A q q q = = . As there are only two countries involved, one country's 
imports must equal the other country's exports. Therefore, in equilibrium, it must be the case 
that 
* *
B A m m - = . 
 
It is easily recognized that the optimization problems and the first-order conditions for the 
agents in each of the countries must be similar to those under autarky, except that imports and 
exports must be accounted for explicitly. Therefore, the equilibrium conditions for each of the 
markets in each of the countries can be expressed as follows: 
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15 The cross-effects may differ between the countries because the share of black electricity in each country may 
be different. If the price of emission permits increases, the country with the highest share of black electricity will 















Inserting 8) and 9) into 6), we find that the equilibrium end-user price can be written as a 
linear combination of the marginal costs of black and green electricity: 
 
























3.2. The effects of the percentage requirement as a means for promoting green electricity 
generation 
In this section, we assume that the percentage requirement may be different between the two 
countries and focus on the effects of an increase in the percentage requirement in one of the 
countries. More precisely, we seek to determine the effects of an increase in country A's 
percentage requirement on green and black electricity generation and electricity consumption 
in both countries. 
 
Taking the implicit derivate of expression 10) with respect to aA, we find that the only signs 
that can be determined with certainty are those belonging to the effects on total combined 
black  electricity  generation  for  countries  A  and  B,  and  the  effects  on  country  B's  green 
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   14 
An inspection of the signs shows that the numerator is positive, whereas the denominator is 
negative. Therefore, the effect on the combined generation of black electricity in the two 
countries is negative. 
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. In other words, somewhat surprisingly, the increase of the percentage 
requirement  in country  A  leads to  an  increase in  both  electricity  consumption  and  green 
electricity generation in country B. The other effects are indeterminate.
17 
 
From  this  analysis,  we  note  in  particular  that  the  effect  of  an  increase  in  country  A's 
percentage  requirement  on  green  electricity  generation  in  that  country  is  indeterminate. 
However,  the  effect  on  country  B  is  determinate.  The  generation  of  green  electricity  in 
country B will increase. Furthermore, electricity consumption in country B will increase, 
whereas the generation of black electricity will fall in both countries. As explained earlier, an 
increase in the percentage requirement will necessarily lead to a reduction in the wholesale 
price of electricity. For country A, the effects on electricity generation and consumption are 
the  same  as  those  under  autarky.  However,  in  this  two-country  model  with  a  common 
electricity  market,  the  reduction  of  the  wholesale  price  will  influence  the  demand  for 
electricity in country B. The reduced wholesale price implies that electricity becomes cheaper 
in country B, leading to an increase in electricity consumption in this country. In order to 
satisfy the percentage requirement, the demand for TGCs will have to increase in country B. 
As there is no trade in TGCs between the countries, the increase in demand for TGCs can 
only be satisfied by a corresponding increase of the TGC supply in country B. Hence, the 
generation of green electricity will have to increase in country B. Therefore, we arrive at the 
                                                
16 Proofs may be obtained from the authors upon request. 
17 From a numerical model satisfying the assumptions of this paper, it can be shown that equilibria exist where 
the green electricity generation and electricity consumption in country A may either increase or decrease 
following an increase in the percentage requirement in country A. The details of this proof are not included in 
the paper, but may be obtained from the authors upon request.   15 
somewhat counterintuitive result that an increase of the percentage requirement in country A 
may lead to a reduction of green electricity generation in country A, but will definitely lead to 
an increase of green electricity in country B. 
 
3.3. The effects of harsher CO2 emission constraints 
Harsher CO2 emission constraints imply a reduction of green electricity generation in both 
countries. To see this, we rearrange 10) to obtain: 
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Differentiating this expression, we arrive at: 
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To obtain a contradiction, assume 0 ³
b d
dzA . Inspecting the signs of expression 12), we see that 
this implies that  0 ³
b d
dzB ,  0 ³
b d
dxA ,  0 ³
b d
dxB , and  0 £
b d
dqM . From 9), we see that 0 £
b d
dqM  
implies that  0 <
b d
dyA  and  0 <
b d
dyB . Upon applying 7) and eliminating  i m , we find that: 
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An inspection of the signs of expression 13) reveals that the left-hand side is nonnegative, 
whereas the right-hand side is negative. Hence, there is a contradiction. Therefore, it follows   16 
that the generation of green electricity and the consumption of electricity must fall in both 
countries. Furthermore, from expression 13), it is apparent that the total generation of black 
electricity must be reduced, whereas expression 12) makes it clear that the wholesale price of 
electricity will have to go up. The intuition behind the reduction of green electricity as a result 
of harsher emission constraints is the same as the intuition for the autarky case, discussed in 
section 2.2. 
4. Trade in electricity and TGCs 
The  focus  of  this  section  is  on  the  case  where  both  electricity  and  TGCs  can  be  traded 
between two countries. This implies that both the wholesale price of electricity and the price 
of TGCs are common between the countries. Hence,  A s  and  B s  are replaced by  M s  in the 
objective functions and first-order conditions below. Otherwise, the model specification is as 
in the previous case. 
 
4.1. First-order conditions and equilibrium 
TGCs will be imported if the domestic demand for certificates exceeds the domestic supply. 
In equilibrium, the imports  of one  country  will  be equivalent  to the exports of the other 
country;  i.e., 
* *
B A n n - = .  The  trade  in  certificates  implies  that  the  relative  share  of  green 
electricity generated in one country may be different from the percentage requirement (see 
expression 15). The equilibrium can be expressed as follows: 
 
14)  ( )
* * *




i i i i
n z
m z y x
a
* *
* * * * +



























Inserting 14) and 15) into 12), we find again that the equilibrium end-user price may be 
written as a linear combination of the marginal costs of black and green electricity: 
   17 
























4.2. The effects of the percentage requirement as a means for promoting green electricity 
generation 
Once again, we focus on the effect of changing the percentage requirement. The analysis 
shows that it is possible to determine only the effect on black electricity generation in this 
case.  Again,  an  increase  in  the  percentage  requirements  leads  to  a  reduction  of  green 




. To realize this, assume the opposite result, 
namely, that an increase of  A a , the percentage requirement in country A, either increases, or 
has no effect on, the total generation of black electricity. This implies an increase in green 
electricity generation in order to fulfill the percentage requirement in both countries. Hence, 
in equilibrium, the consumption of green electricity must increase in both countries, as we 
now have a common market for both electricity and TGCs. Constant or increased generation 
of black electricity implies that the wholesale price,  M q , is constant or increases, respectively. 
Furthermore, for the generation of green electricity to increase, the price of green electricity, 
M M s q + , must also increase. From equation 14), we notice that this implies an increase in the 
end-user price of electricity in both countries. This is not compatible with an increase in the 
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. Considering the total generation of green electricity, the effect of 
increasing the percentage requirement in country A will be indeterminate again. As we now 












= . Thus, in contrast to the case of trade in electricity only, an additional 
opportunity for trading certificates implies that we no longer obtain the unambiguous result   18 
that an increase of  A a  leads to an increase in green electricity generation in country B. The 
change  in  green  electricity  generation  must  now  occur  in  the  same  direction  in  both 
countries.
18 The effect on the other variables is indeterminate. Finally, the results show that 
the effect on electricity consumption is indeterminate in both countries. 
 
 
4.3. The effects of harsher CO2 emission constraints 
In  this  case,  harsher  CO2  emission  constraints  imply  a  reduction  of  green  electricity 
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To obtain a contradiction, assume that the generation of green electricity in country A is not 
reduced; i.e.,  0 ³
b d
dzA . From expression 16), we find that if one country does not reduce 
green  electricity  generation,  this  implies  that  the  other  country  will  not  reduce  its  green 
electricity generation either. This must be the case as both countries are subject to the same 
change in  M M s q + . From expression 19), we observe that this means that the consumption of 
electricity in at least one of the countries must be either increase or remain constant. Assume 
that country A does not reduce its consumption of electricity; i.e.,  0 ³
b d
dxA  (a parallel proof 
exists  for  the  case  where  country  B  does  not  reduce  its  consumption  of  electricity). 












































































                                                
18 Proofs may be obtained from the authors upon request.   19 
As  0 ³
b d
dzA  and  0 ³
b d
dxA , we observe from expression 21) that  0 £
b d
dqM , which implies 
0 <
b d
dyA  and  0 <
b d
dyB . Therefore, the right-hand side of expression 20) is negative, whereas 
the  right-hand  side  of  expression  19)  is  nonnegative.  For  this  to  happen,  we  must  have 
0 <
b d
dxB  and in addition B A a a > . As we have assumed that green electricity generation does 
not decline and we have that  0 £
b d
dqM , we must have  0 ³
b d
dsM . From expression 12), we see 
that for green electricity generation to decrease in country A, we must have B A a a < . This 
contradicts the above result of B A a a > . 
 
Once  again,  the  conclusion  is  that  green  electricity  generation  will  be  reduced  in  both 
countries as a consequence of harsher emission constraints. The mechanisms underlying the 
result in this case, where trade takes place in electricity and TGCs, are the same as for the 
cases of autarky and trade in electricity only. Moreover, both total black electricity generation 




One of the main conclusions of this paper is that the percentage requirement is not a very 
precise policy measure for stimulating investments in green electricity generation capacity. 
Thus, in general it is not true that an increase in the percentage requirement leads to more 
investments in such capacity. This result is applies not only to a domestic TGC market under 
autarky, but also to the case where two countries trade in TGCs and electricity. However, it 
should be noted that a larger percentage requirement may be compatible with more green 
electricity  generation  over  time  if  there  is  a  general  increase  in  demand.  However,  the 
immediate effect of a higher percentage requirement on green electricity generation cannot be 
guaranteed. This weakness is unique to this system. For instance, a fixed per unit subsidy 
system would not involve such ambiguity because an increase of a fixed per unit subsidy 
definitely leads to more green generation capacity.
19 Hence, if the objective is to achieve a 
                                                
19 Moreover, the percentage requirement for a single country is not a very potent measure if the country in 
question is part of a large internationally integrated system of competitive markets for electricity and TGCs. 
Such a circumstance would imply that the prices of electricity and TGCs are given, and that the electricity   20 
given target of new green generation capacity, a TGC system is not the best system to use. 
Other systems, such as a tendering or auction system, or a system of plain subsidies, may 
work better in this respect. However, the TGC system provides a strong role for market forces 
and takes account of consumers' willingness to pay for electricity via the effects on demand 
and the end-user price. In addition, the TGC system allows for voluntary purchases of TGCs 
by consumers who wish to support green electricity generation.
20 
 
Until recently, only a few economies had experienced running TGC markets. In the UK, 
TGCs were traded at around 45 GBP/MWh in 2004 (Platts, 2004). This system seems to have 
generated interest among investors in the construction of new green electricity generation 
capacity (see e.g., Butler and Neuhoff, 2004). In Sweden, trade statistics show that the TGC 
price has been established at a rather high level, partly because of Sweden's high percentage 
requirement,  which  was  set  at  9.5%  in  2005,  and  its  ambitious  plans  to  increase  the 
percentage requirement to 15.3% by 2010. In addition, the TGC price has been set close to the 
penalty price, the upper price bound. Partly for this reason, many retailers have chosen not to 
purchase  TGCs,  but  instead  to  pay  the  penalty  price  directly,  thereby  avoiding  some 
transaction costs. Indeed, in 2003, one out of four companies chose to pay the penalty rather 
than to purchase or use their TGCs. From 2005 onwards, a new system for determining the 
penalty is being introduced. Essentially, it involves setting the penalty price at 150% of the 
annual average of the TGC price. It is likely that the expectation of even higher TGC prices 
under this new system has led many companies to hoard their TGCs for future sale/use. In 
2003, only 77% of issued TGCs were used. Records of the Swedish experience of TGCs are 
scarce and uncertainty remains as to the significance of the TGC market for generating new 
green electricity generation capacity. 
 
An  important  result  of  the  paper  is  that  making  CO2  emission  constraints  harsher  and 
increasing emission permit prices leads to less capacity for green electricity generation when 
CO2 trade is combined with a TGC system, as explained in section 2.3. Thus, the tradable 
emissions  permit  system  (TEP)  and  the  TGC  system  may  be  viewed  as  alternatives.  In 
addition, this raises the question of why two policy measures are required to achieve one goal, 
                                                                                                                                                   
producers and the retailing companies in the economy will adapt to these prices. However, this in turn implies 
that neither the percentage requirement nor the TGC price bounds for a given country can be used to influence 
the green electricity generation or the composition of green and black electricity in that country. 
20 The option of buying green electricity at a surcharge has been offered in many countries, for instance 
Vattenfall in Sweden. However, demand has been low.   21 
as in the case of the European ETS and TGC systems, which both seem to aim at achieving 
clean energy generation.  Presumably, the answer  is that the aims of  the two  systems are 
somewhat different. The TEP system is targeted at reducing the global emissions of CO2, 
whereas  the  TGC  system  is  targeted  at  achieving  an  electricity  supply  from  renewable 
sources. Clearly, the TGC system may achieve a reduction of CO2 emissions, but it also 
reduces the use of nonrenewable sources, notably crude oil and natural gas, that are in scarce 
supply and used at the expense of future generations. 
 
A further issue is how to combine the systems in an optimal way. One option for Europe is to 
retain its widespread ETS system as a base and put the TGC system "on top" of this.
21 As yet, 
the impact of the ETS system on the generation of green electricity is unknown. On its own, 
the ETS system—if it behaves according to principles—will lead to an equalization of the 
end-user price of electricity with the marginal cost of black electricity generation and with the 
marginal cost of green electricity generation plus the imputed subsidy from the ETS system. If 
the  green  electricity  generation  stimulated  by  the  ETS  system  is  not  sufficient,  the  TGC 
system  may  act  as  further  stimulation  of  green  electricity  generation.  In  that  case,  the 
equalization  of  the  various  marginal  costs,  including  the  subsidies,  will  be  distorted,  as 
explained in the previous sections (i.e., it will result in linear combinations of marginal costs). 
However, as explained earlier, more direct ways of stimulating green electricity generation 
include  allowing  per  unit  subsidies  of  green  electricity  generation  capacity,  or  using  an 
auction or a tendering system. 
 
Additional problems associated with the TGC systems need to be resolved. One problem 
relates  to  TGC  price  volatility.  If  the  green  generation  technologies  in  a  country  largely 
consist of wind or water power, sizable and erratic variations of green electricity generation 
may occur, owing to natural annual variations of wind or precipitation, which may amount to 
as  much  as  ± 20%  for  each  for  the  Nordic  countries.  Therefore,  there  will  be  similar 
variations in the numbers of TGCs for sale. This in turn will give rise to a high price volatility 
of  TGCs,  involving  serious  price  spikes.  The  reason  for  the  high  volatility  is  that  TGC 
demand is highly inelastic because, under the percentage rule, it is only a fraction of the 
demand elasticity for electricity. Hence, potential investors in green electricity capacity face a 
highly uncertain rate of return on their investments and therefore require high expected rates 
                                                
21 On this problem, see Hindsberger et al. (2003) and Jensen and Skytte (2003).   22 
of return to be willing to invest. To some extent, the problem of price volatility may be 
resolved  by  the  introduction  of  banking;  i.e.,  allowing  agents  to  keep  TGCs  for  future 
use/sale. This kind of arrangement is known to have a price-dampening effect, even though 
occasional  price  spikes  may  still  occur.  In  addition,  banking  is  known  to  improve  the 
functioning of the market in terms of an increased social surplus. 
 
Another  problem  related  to  the  TGC  market  is  the  potentially  high  market  power  that  a 
producer  of  green  electricity  may  possess.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  the  percentage 
requirement  implies  that  one  TGC  counts  for  a  multiple  of  MWh  in  consumption.  For 
instance, if the percentage requirement is 10%, the action of not selling a TGC will reduce 
consumption by 10 MWh, with a corresponding increase in the end-user price. Hence, by 
withholding TGCs, a producer of green electricity may significantly increase the end-user 
price, even though the producer's own power generation is not that large. Amundsen and Nese 
(2002) have shown that a TGC market with market power may even collapse into an ordinary 
subsidy system where the price limits (i.e., the upper-end penalty price or the lower-end resale 
price) constitute the per unit subsidy. 
 
6. Summary and concluding remarks 
The  focus  of  this  paper  has  been  on  the  role  of  policy  measures  in  TGC  markets,  the 
integration of country-specific TGC markets, and compatibility issues between TGC markets 
and an integrated TEP system. The analysis was based on a static long-run analytical model, 
which was used to deduce results for three different scenarios: first, a TGC system in an 
autarky; then, a TGC system implemented in a country that trades electricity with another 
country; and finally a case where TGC systems are implemented in two countries that trade 
both electricity and TGCs. For all scenarios, the effects of harsher CO2 emissions constraints 
were investigated. 
 
Our main results can be summarized as follows: 
·  The  effect  of  changing  the  percentage  requirement  on  the  generation  of  green 
electricity is indeterminate. Thus, an increase of the percentage requirement will not 
necessarily  lead  to  an  increase  of  green  electricity  generation  in  the  long  run.  It 
guarantees only an increase in green electricity's share of total consumption. These   23 
results are shown to be valid for all the cases investigated; i.e., under autarky and 
when electricity, or both electricity and TGCs, are traded between two countries. 
·  The effect of an increase in the percentage requirement on black electricity generation 
will always be negative. 
·  Under autarky, an increase of the percentage requirement will have an indeterminate 
effect  on  the  total  consumption  of  electricity.  In  the  case  where  one  country 
implements a TGC system and trades electricity with another country, the effect of an 
increase of the percentage requirement on total consumption will be indeterminate in 
the  country  implementing  the  TGC  system.  However,  the  other  country  will 
experience an increase in both the total electricity consumption and green electricity 
generation. However, allowing the trade of TGCs between the countries leads to an 
indeterminate effect on both these variables in the country that does not implement the 
TGC system.  
·  In the case of TGCs working in combination with a system of traded CO2 emission 
permits, a harsher CO2 emission constraint will push the price of TGCs downwards, 
lowering the profits of the green electricity producers. Therefore, such a policy will 
induce a reduction in the generation of green electricity. This result was shown to be 
valid in all our specified cases. 
 
Along with the other potential problems discussed above, the problems revealed in this paper 
clearly call for caution in the design and implementation of TGC systems, not least when they 
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